U.S. Arms Transfer Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991

Jeffrey Lefebvre's analysis uses a supplier-recipient bargaining model to examine U.S. security policy in northeast Africa from 1953 to 1991. The work draws on State Department, Pentagon, and AID documents, congressional staff interviews, and ambassador consultations. Lefebvre concludes that U.S. diplomacy was overly influenced by Cold War mentality, exposing interests to unnecessary risks.

Use Cases

• Analyze Cold War arms transfer bargaining models based on the supplier-recipient framework described
• Study shifts in U.S. foreign policy based on documented changes in 1953, 1960, 1964-66, 1973, 1977-78, and the Reagan administration
• Assess the impact of human rights considerations on military aid based on Carter's 1977 policy change
• Model geopolitical risk in Third World engagements based on the conclusion of misguided policy over four decades
• Trace U.S.-Soviet competition in Africa based on references to Soviet-sponsored buildups and policy reversals

Strengths

• Analysis spans four decades of policy from 1953 to 1991
• Research methodology includes massive documentation and extensive interviewing of officials and advisers
• Focuses on two primary antagonists in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia and Somalia

Limitations

• Row count is unknown, which may limit suitability assessment
• Column-level documentation is absent; field semantics must be inferred after download
• Last update date is unknown; freshness unverified

Provenance

Source

Ryan M Irwin via paperswithcode

Collection Method

Historical analysis using documentation and interviews with government officials and advisers

Time Range

1953-1991

Geography

Ethiopia, Somalia, Horn of Africa