Public Procurement Officer Experiment in Punjab, Pakistan

A field experiment in Punjab, Pakistan, studied the effects of autonomy and performance pay on 600 public procurement officers across 26 districts. The data likely contains outcomes on procurement prices, quality, and officer time use, revealing that autonomy reduced prices by 9% without quality loss. Results illustrate how organizational hierarchy and monitor behavior interact with incentives.

Use Cases

• Analyzing the impact of autonomy on procurement prices and quality
• Studying the interaction between performance pay and monitor approval delays
• Modeling time-use responses of bureaucrats to different incentive structures
• Evaluating anti-corruption policies in public sector hierarchies

Strengths

• Based on a field experiment with a sample of 600 procurement officers, providing empirical evidence
• Conducted in collaboration with a government (Punjab, Pakistan), suggesting real-world relevance
• Measures concrete outcomes like a 9% price reduction from autonomy

Limitations

• Key metadata like column names, row counts, and specific data formats are unknown
• Sources conflict on the license, listing both 'Open Access (green)' and 'closed'
• No information on data freshness or last update date is provided

Provenance

Source

Michael L. Best (Columbia University), in collaboration with the Government of Punjab, Pakistan

Collection Method

Field experiment involving shifting authority and introducing financial incentives

Geography

Punjab, Pakistan (26 districts)