Field Experiment Data on Antitrust Compliance and Collusion

The replication package for a field experiment on antitrust compliance, accepted for publication in the Journal of Political Economy in 2026. It supports the replication of findings from a study investigating regulatory compliance and collusion in auctions. The specific number of rows, columns, and file formats are not detailed in the input.

Use Cases

• Replicate the experimental analysis of compliance scoring mechanisms described in the associated study.
• Analyze behavioral patterns related to collusion in auction settings using the experiment's recorded outcomes.
• Study the effects of regulatory interventions on firm behavior within the field experiment framework.

Strengths

• Data is directly associated with a study accepted by the Journal of Political Economy, a top-tier journal.
• The dataset was last updated in February 2026, indicating recent maintenance.

Limitations

• The dataset description lacks concrete structural details such as row count, column names, and file formats.
• As a replication package for a specific study, its utility is primarily for verification and extension of that single experiment.

Provenance

Source

Journal of Political Economy, via Dataverse.

Collection Method

Field experiment data.

Freshness

Last updated on 2026-02-12.