Replication data for a study analyzing the supply-side drivers of bribery, linking firm management quality to corrupt practices. The research combines cross-national business survey analysis with a field experiment in Vietnam, where firms were randomly assigned to management training. The experiment found trained firms paid monthly bribes less than one-fifth the size of the placebo group.
Use Cases
- Analyze the relationship between firm management quality and bribery payment amounts using experimental treatment data.
- Test theoretical predictions on bribery supply using cross-national business survey variables.
- Examine the link between management training interventions and subsequent levels of regulatory compliance.
- Compare bribery outcomes between the experimentally assigned treatment and placebo groups of firms.
Strengths
- Data underpins a published study with a formal model and two connected empirical tests.
- Includes a randomized field experiment component, allowing for causal inference on management training effects.
- Findings are grounded in detailed accounting books from the experimental firms, providing precise bribery measures.
Limitations
- Specific column names, row counts, and file formats are not provided in the input metadata.
- The cross-national survey component may suffer from self-reporting biases common in corruption research.
- The field experiment's findings in Vietnam may not be fully generalizable to other national contexts.
Provenance
- Source
- Harvard Dataverse, authored by Edmund Malesky.
- Collection Method
- Combines analysis of cross-national business survey data with a randomized field experiment in Vietnam.
- Time Range
- null
- Freshness
- null
- Geography
- Cross-national survey and a specific field experiment in Vietnam.