Replication data for a study analyzing the constitutional treaties of international organizations created between 1945 and 2005. The research investigates how institutional rules like veto and exit rights protect materially weak states from powerful ones. The dataset was authored by Benjamin Daßler and is hosted on the International Studies Quarterly Dataverse.
Use Cases
- Analyzing the relationship between founding member power distribution and treaty design based on the described theory.
- Testing the functional substitutability of veto and exit rights as institutional safeguards.
- Modeling the institutional power equilibrium in international organizations based on treaty provisions.
- Replicating the study's findings on design patterns in constitutional treaties.
Strengths
- Data supports a study published in a peer-reviewed journal (International Studies Quarterly).
- The analysis covers a defined time period of international organization creation from 1945 to 2005.
Limitations
- Column-level documentation is absent; field semantics must be inferred after download.
- Row count is unknown, which may limit suitability assessment.
Provenance
- Source
- International Studies Quarterly Dataverse
- Collection Method
- Likely compiled from analysis of constitutional treaties of international organizations.
- Time Range
- 1945-2005
- Freshness
- Last updated 2026-05-26 20:55:38; freshness should be verified.