Evolutionary Game Analysis of E-Commerce Intellectual Property Stakeholders

China's e-commerce intellectual property protection is analyzed using a multi-stakeholder evolutionary game model based on social co-governance theory. The study, authored by Ji Li and updated in March 2026, models strategic interactions between government, platforms, operators, and consumers. Numerical simulations examine how costs, benefits, rewards, penalties, and social reputation influence stakeholder behavior.

Use Cases

• Analyze the impact of action costs and benefits on the strategic decisions of government, platforms, operators, and consumers in the evolutionary game model.
• Simulate the effect of reward-punishment mechanism intensity on stakeholder incentives for intellectual property protection.
• Model the role of social reputation in the dynamic evolution of behavioral strategies towards a stable governance equilibrium.

Strengths

• Model grounded in social co-governance theory, a specific theoretical framework.
• Analysis includes four distinct stakeholder groups: government, e-commerce platforms, operators, and consumers.
• Released under the permissive CC BY 4.0 license for broad reuse.
• Dataset was updated in March 2026, indicating recent maintenance.

Limitations

• The dataset is a 44.5 KB DOCX file containing a research paper, not structured tabular data for direct analysis.
• No quantitative data rows, columns, or sample data are provided for machine learning applications.
• The geographic focus is explicitly on China's e-commerce sector, limiting generalizability.

Provenance

Source

figshare, authored by Ji Li.

Collection Method

Constructed from an evolutionary game model and numerical simulations for a research study.

Freshness

Last updated 2026-03-23.

Geography

China