Laboratory Bargaining Experiment Data on Commitment Problems

The dataset contains results from incentivized laboratory experiments testing a resource division model with repeated interaction. The experiments were conducted by Dustin Tingley of Harvard University Press to study the 'dark side of the future' in bargaining. The data likely captures outcomes related to social efficiency and changes in bargaining strength.

Use Cases

• Testing theoretical predictions about the negative relationship between repeated interaction likelihood and social efficiency based on the described model.
• Analyzing the impact of changes in bargaining strength on commitment problems as described in the paper.
• Replicating or extending the laboratory experiment findings on the 'dark side of the future' in bargaining scenarios.

Strengths

• Data originates from a controlled, incentivized laboratory experiment, which suggests internal validity.
• The dataset is linked to a specific theoretical model and hypothesis described in the paper.

Limitations

• Column-level documentation is absent; field semantics must be inferred after download.
• Row count is unknown, which may limit suitability assessment.
• Last update date is unknown; freshness unverified.

Provenance

Source

Dustin Tingley, Harvard University Press

Collection Method

Incentivized laboratory experiments

Time Range

null

Freshness

Last update date is unknown; freshness unverified.

Geography

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